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Three questions lie at the center of the philosophical controversy over 
proper names: 
1) Do proper names have a sense? 
2) If so, does the sense fix the reference? 
3) Are name-to-name identity claims about words or their 
referent(s)? 
These questions have given rise to considerable dispute. The reason for 
this, I will argue, is that each is crucially ambiguous. The issues hinge on 
the interpretation given to 'have', 'fix' and 'about', respectively. 
Recognizing these ambiguities makes it possible to give the disputants on 
each side their due. It also removes some of the puzzlement that 
occasions these questions. I will conclude that proper names do not 
possess a sense, but carry one; that sense can help fix reference initially, 
but need not thereafter; and that name-to-name identity claims can 
convey information about words even though they do not describe them. 
I 
1. The problem with answering the first question in the negative is that 
one then has trouble explaining how name-to-name identity claims (such 
as "Hesperous is Phosphorous") can have real cognitive and empirical 
content. Frege argued that if names have only reference and no sense, 
then identity claims that equate them should be analytic, and devoid of 
cognitive content. But they aren't analytic; they often have cognitive, even 
empirical content. So names must have sense (111, pp. 25 ff). 
If one answers the first question in the affirmative, however, it would 
seem that one must then give an account of what this sense consists in. 
One such account is typically associated with Russell. According to 
Russell, a name is just a shorthand for a description, the description giving 
the sense of the name ([3], p. 62). The problem with this view is that a 
statement predicating of the named thing a feature mentioned in its 
"defining" description would then be analytic. For example, if being the 
highest mountain in the world is Everest's defining feature, then the claim 
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that Everest is that would be an analytic truth.1 But that is a contingent 
and empirical fact. Hence a name cannot be just a shorthand for a 
description. 
Another account of the sense of a name identifies it with that of a 
cluster of descriptions. But this does not remove the difficulty. For it 
makes no difference whether the predicate "is the highest mountain in the 
world" identifies the lone identifying property of Everest, or just one 
amongst many. As long as such descriptions are spoken of as belonging to 
the name itself, or making up its sense, then (on the supposition that 
meaning includes sense,) the claim: "Everest is the highest mountain in 
the world" will remain true by virtue of the meaning of the terms alone, 
and thus count as analytic. 
A significant step towards the resolution of this puzzle was made, I 
think, when Searle identified an ambiguity in the question: 
If this ("Do proper names have a sense?"] asks 
whether or not proper names are used to describe or 
specify characteristics of objects, the answer is 'no'. But if 
it asks whether or not proper names are logically 
connected with characteristics of the object to which they 
refer, the answer is 'yes, in a loose sort of way1 ([4], p. 96). 
I think that Searle has diagnosed the core of the problem. But I also think 
that the distinction he makes needs to be spelled out more fully if we are to 
avoid confusion. The "have" of our question is ambiguous. It can be 
understood as indicating anything from a very strict to a much "looser" 
connection. (I am not quite sure what it means here to call this connection 
"logical.") On a suitably strong reading, the question is whether names 
possess a sense, or whether an internal relation obtains between a name 
and certain descriptions of the object it designates. It asks, that is, whether 
such descriptions belong to the (meaning of the) name. Such a construal 
would clearly incline one towards a negative answer, for a positive answer 
has the unpleasant consequence that the attribution to a name of 
properties contained in its sense would be (but ought not to be,) analytic. 
On a more forgiving reading of "have," a name need only be 
contingently related—indeed merely associated—with a description. That 
is, a name has a sense if it connotes. This reading makes it difficult to deny 
that names have sense. To avoid confusion, let us say that a name can 
carry a sense, even if it does not possess one. The distinction allows us to 
1 Of course, being the highest mountain in the world is a relational, and 
presumably contingent, property. One might, a la Kripke, use a predicate 
that employs a pronoun (like the property of having its unique history), to 
construct an example with a somewhat different force. We will examine 
Kripke's conception of rigid designation in what follows. 
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present a thesis that avoids the difficulties the stronger claim founders on, 
yet still allows us to explain the fact that we can leam from name-to-name 
identity claims. In brief, a name can carry a sense, though it need not 
possess one. The question of whether names do in fact possess sense, of 
course, remains.2 
2 The fact that descriptions are useful and often necessary for the 
purposes of learning to use a name lends credence to the view that sense 
determines reference. For without a description to pick out the thing to be 
named, how is the learner to identify that which the name names? In 
cases where the learner is not acquainted with the object, it would seem 
that description, or invocation of sense, is indispensible. Even in cases of 
ostension, description is often necessary to mitigate indeterminacy. The 
question, as Searle puts it, is this: "As a proper name does not in general 
specify any characteristics of the object referred to, how then does it bring 
the reference off?" (141, p.94). 
The idea that a single characteristic picks out a name's reference runs 
into difficulty over the fact that we can usually without contradiction 
imagine discovering that the object in question did not have the 
supposedly definitive characteristic. We might, for instance, discover that 
Everest is not really the tallest mountain in the world. To deal with this 
problem, Searle gives what Kripke calls the "cluster theory" of naming. It 
amounts to the idea that a certain indeterminate class of descriptions 
together pick out the object: that a sense composed of a complex of 
descriptions determines reference. 
This account has the virtue of explaining how the reference of 
'Aristotle' can remain fairly stable through changes in what we know about 
Aristotle. Because the reference of 'Aristotle' is not fixed by one 
description alone, but by a set of overlapping descriptions, we are not 
2 This question should be seen in connection with that of whether the use 
of a name involves asserting or presupposing the name's sense. Where 
Russell affirmed that a claim employing a name does assert that the 
name's referent has the properties indicated by its sense, Frege denied 
this. I think that Grice's studies of conversational implicature offer 
interesting possibilities for giving an account of this relation. Thus: The 
present king of France is bald' might conversationally imply that there is a 
present king of France, even though it does not entail or assert that there is 
a present king of France. Whether or not it presupposes this will depend 
on how one understands "presupposition." For example, if one gives the 
following, justification-conditions account of presupposition: P 
presupposes R iff showing that R is false undermines the force of P, then 
one would have to count "There is a present king of France" as a 
presupposition of T h e present king of France is bald." Although these are 
interesting questions, they cannot be pursued in depth here. 
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thrown into immediate perplexity when it is suggested that Aristotle might 
not, after all, have, say, written the Nichomachean Ethics. 
Searle argues that his account has the correlative virtue that it 
explains the real indeterminacy in our criteria of individuation. Suppose 
we discovered that Aristotle did not write the Nichomachean Ethics or 
study with Plato. Would he still be Aristotle? How much of what we now 
attribute to Aristotle would have to be discovered to belong to another 
man before 'Aristotle' would refer to him instead? We should expect 
indeterminacy just here because the question of what Aristotle's defining 
features are is "not decided for us in advance" ([4]. p. 94). Reference, on 
this account, seems to be determined somewhat indefinitely by a cluster of 
descriptions. 
Kripke says of this "cluster" account that it "really is a nice theory. The 
only defect I think it has is probably common to all philosophical theories. 
It's wrong" ([2], p. 64). He begins his critique by attacking Searle's claim 
that "it is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive 
disjunction, of properties commonly attributed to him: any individual not 
having at least some of these properties could not be Aristotle" ((4), p. 95). 
Kripke flat out denies that this is necessary, claiming that "it's a contingent 
fact that Aristotle ever did any of the things commonly attributed to him 
today, any of the great achievements we so much admire" (121, p. 75). 
His basis for this judgement is his claim that proper names designate 
rigidly, or refer to their objects across all possible worlds. We can vary, in 
imagination, Aristotle's (contingent) characteristics, accomplishments, 
and properties quite freely, and still 'Aristotle' would refer to Aristotle. It is 
a condition on the possibility of imagining a different Aristotle that 
'Aristotle' rigidly designate just him. He might have died as a child, for 
instance, and still Aristotle would have been. That he wrote the Ethics, 
studied with Plato, and taught Alexander the Great are all contingent 
truths-they might have been otherwise. But that he would not have been 
Aristotle is inconceivable. 
The upshot of this asymmetry between names and descriptions is that 
sense does not determine reference. For although the set of descriptions 
that make up the sense of a name seldom picks out a unique object, 
probably not uncommonly picks out the wrong object, and sometimes fails 
to pick out an object at all, the name that carries it still refers.3 That is, 
though all of these ways of "determining" reference might fail, the name 
would still refer to its object. What makes it possible for a name to do this? 
For Kripke, simply the fact that it designates rigidly. All of which means 
that reference is fixed by something other than sense. 
Kripke's alternative account of how reference is fixed is causal. 
Beginning with an ostensive or descriptive "initial baptism," a name is 
"passed from link to link" along a causal chain, each receiver of the name 
3 This, I take it, is the jist of Kripke's argument. See pp. 80-90. 
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intending to use it to designate the same referent as the user before ([2], 
p.96). Clearly Kripke has radically reconceived what it is to fix a reference. 
And on the basis of this reconception, he denies that sense is what fixes 
reference. 
So who is right, Searle or Kripke? It seems to me that the issue turns 
on what the question: "What fixes reference?" is asking for. The question 
is ambiguous. Does it ask for an account of some mysterious and ineffable 
connection called "picking out" by virtue of which the use of a name is able 
to refer? The notion of rigid designation might seem to call for an account 
of this kind, but Kripke's causal model of reference-fixing constitutes a 
strong implicit denial that we ought to think in such terms. His construal of 
what it is to "fix" reference is concrete and historical. Thus demystifying 
the question, however, does not remove the ambiguity. Does it ask for a 
genetic account—that is, a story about the origin of the name—where fixing 
is understood in causal-historical terms? Or does it request, rather, some 
psychological story about how reference is initially and thereafter 
anchored in any given agent's linguistic competence? The question itself, 
I think, does not tell us. 
Initial baptisms often require descriptions to individuate the object to 
be named. Does this mean that, in such cases, sense determines 
reference? If we look at the bare fact that a description is helping the 
potential user of a name identify its object, it can look that way. But how 
can the description be thought of as part of the name's sense, when the 
naming relation has not yet been set up? And how about each new link in 
the chain? Doesn't the reference need to be fixed for each new user? How 
else could new users come to learn the correct use of the name? And don't 
descriptions function generously in this fixing, often constituting all the 
potential user has to go on in figuring out to what the name refers? 
Doesn't this mean that sense determines reference? 
It seems relatively clear that descriptions play an important role in the 
learning (certainly one sense of "fixing") of names. Searle's account is a 
reminder of this dimension of reference-fixing. Kripke's denial that sense 
determines reference is intended to point at something else: the fact that a 
learned name in some sense frees itself from the descriptions that initially 
anchored it. While I may have learned the name 'Moses' by means of the 
description: 'the man that parted the Red Sea,' I may subsequently come 
to question whether in fact Moses did accomplish this feat. The only 
reason that such speculation is not simply self-contradictory or incoherent 
is that the name 'Moses' has freed itself from the description that initially 
anchored it in my understanding. The contingency of such claims as 
'Moses parted the Red Sea' is definitive evidence, for Kripke, that it is not 
sense that fixes reference. The reference of 'Moses' is rather fixed by a 
causal chain of a particular kind that leads back to Moses himself. 
So in what sense, if any, can we say that sense determines reference? 
An adequate answer, I think, should take account of the following. In the 
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context of an 'initial baptism', description often plays a part in fixing 
reference, by helping the baptizers to pick out what is to be christened with 
the new name. Sense can play a similar role each time the use of a name 
is taught to a new user. But once someone's conception of a named thing 
is sufficiently rich and stable, it frees itself from dependence upon 
contingent descriptions, and can designate rigidly.4 The reference 
thereafter remains fixed upon its object, no longer determined by its 
sense. So to "fix reference" can mean any of several things, among them to 
"baptize', 'pick out', 'help get a handle on', 'anchor' and 'designate rigidly'. 
Although precision would perhaps best be served by unasking the 
question entirely, we can indicate a rough resolution to the Kripke-Searle 
debate with the phrase: sense may help determine reference initially, but 
it need not thereafter.5 
3. And these same philosophers have taken different sides on the issue 
of what name-to-name identity claims are about as well. Frege argues 
that, on the view that such claims express a "relation between objects," 
such a claim is reduced to an analytic expression of self-identity. But how, 
then, can one explain the fact that identity claims sometimes constitute 
valuable extensions of our knowledge? 
A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to 
itself, and indeed one in whch each thing stands to itself 
but to no other thing. What we apparently want to state 
by a=b is that the signs or names 'a' and 'b' designate the 
same thing, so that those signs themselves would be 
under discussion ([1], p. 56). 
What a sentence like "Cicero is Tully" tells us is that these two different 
names designate the same thing; that we can use the names 
interchangeably. The statement is about, and expresses an identity 
4 Two comments on this are perhaps in order. First, I cannot say precisely 
what I mean by a "sufficiently rich and stable" conception. I do not know 
whether, for example, such a conception involves a cluster of descriptions. 
It would, I think, involve a certain degree of competence in the use of the 
name, and a measure of confidence in one's ability to use it competently. 
Second, my aim here is not to assert the priority of descriptions in the 
fixing of reference. The comment simply expresses a phenomenological 
observation. 
5 Searle actually considers this 'solution' to the dilemma, but ties it up— 
unnecessarily, I think— with the thesis that names do not have (or carry) a 
sense at all. He then rejects it on the basis of this quite spurious 
association. See pp. 91-92. 
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between, names, even though it is made true by the fact that their 
referents are identical. 
Searle takes the opposite view. 'The statement (Cicero = Tully)," he 
says, "is not about words." His argument consists first in distinguishing 
illustration from description. Such a claim, he argues, "illustrates or 
exemplifies certain contingent facts about words, though it does not of 
course describe these facts." Though it might show us something about 
names, it does not follow that it describes or is about those names. "People 
who argue that Shakespeare was Bacon," he points out, "are not advancing 
a thesis about language" ((41, pp. 89-90). 
Searle admits, however, that a name-to-name identity claim "could be 
used to make an analytic statement" (i.e. about words), but that "it does not 
follow that it could not also be used to make a synthetic statement" (i.e. 
about objects in the world) ([4], p. 90). So for Searle, it seems that such 
claims are themselves "not about words", but they can be used to tell us 
about words or things. To avoid a contradiction, it seems Searle must 
make a distinction between what an identity claim tells us (under certain 
circumstances, and with reference to certain purposes), and what the 
claim is (really) about. I'm not sure that such a distinction can be 
maintained, but I do think that its origin and rationale can be explained. 
Searle's advice that we look at the context and the use is instructive. 
Imagine a situation in which a name-to-name identity claim might arise 
and serve a definite purpose. I am telling a story, and my listener has not 
yet figured out that two names I have been using refer to the same 
character. I mention that Dr. Jekyll has a certain characteristic—for 
example, that he is an exceptionally furry fellow— and my friend responds 
with perplexity: "I thought it was Mr. Hyde that was the exceptionally furry 
fellow-?" "Don't you get it?," I say, "Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde> 
Now was my last statement about names or their (common) referent? 
The simple self-identity of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is not what motivates 
me to make the identity claim. The claim only has significance, (i.e. a role) 
because my friend has not yet linked the two names and the sets of 
descriptions that attach to each. I am aware of this, and my speech act is a 
conscious attempt to help her link the two sets of descriptions. Searle's 
claim that "names function as pegs on which we hang descriptions" is 
useful here ([4], p. 95). For it seems that what I convey to her is that each 
name-peg will bear the weight of the other's descriptions. ("Oh, I see!," she 
might say, "Now I can go on!") Viewed with an eye towards its practical 
significance, the statement appears to be about words as much as about 
their referents. 
But from a more theoretical vantage-point, it seems necessary to 
distinguish what the statement refers to directly from what it makes 
reference to indirectly. And what it speaks of directly is not words, but Dr. 
6 Thanks to Todd Grantham for this exceptionally nice example. 
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Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, the character(s). From this perspective, what the 
claim is really about is Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde. Strictly (or theoretically) 
speaking, the statement is not about words. 
This controversy is generated, apparently, by the fact that we can look 
at and understand a name-to-name identity claim in two radically 
different ways. We can see it in context, as a practically-oriented speech 
act; and we can equally well see it in isolation, from a theoretical vantage-
point, as a statement that is about the thing(s) to which the names refer. 
The question of whether name-to-name identity claims are about words or 
their objects is the question of which attitude it is appropriate to adopt. 
But the question is unsituated: it does not give us enough information to 
determine which attitude is appropriate. It seems to me that either 
attitude might be correct; that neither has exclusive rights here. Although 
neither claim is incorrect, neither gets at the whole truth. 
II 
It now becomes possible to re-interpret the first two controversies in 
light of the insights generated by the last. They, too, represent showdowns 
between the theoretical and the practical attitude. The view that names do 
not have a sense is the result of viewing them from the theoretical vantage-
point, which wants to distinguish what belongs to the name in itself, from 
what is attached to it only contingently. The opposing view, that names do 
have sense, is the way the practical attitude sees the matter: what names 
are is what they do, and neither can be isolated from their sense. The 
conclusion we reached before, that names carry but do not possess sense, 
can now be seen as an attempt to adjudicate between the theoretical and 
the practical attitudes. It was based, however, on a distinction between 
what properly ('internally', 'necessarily', 'really') belongs to a name, and 
what just attaches to it ('externally', 'contingently', etc.). 7 Does this not 
constitute a capitulation to the demands of the theoretical attitude? 
Perhaps. But due to the fact that there are no obvious or immediate 
alternatives, this resolution itself constitutes a rough and ready practical 
solution to the dilemma at hand. It may not put the issue to rest, but it 
does, I think, give us a more perspicuous view of the problem.8 
7 I do not think that this must be conceived as a distinction with theoretical 
integrity for this resolution to work. The difference it indicates, that is, may 
be a matter of degree rather than of kind. Thus viewed, I think, one 
needn't take issue with Quine's denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction. 
(Quine's argument against that distinction presupposes that a distinction 
must have theoretical integrity to be a distinction at all.) 
8 There is, no doubt, more work to be done here. My thanks to Keith 
Coleman for pointing this out, and for exceptionally helpful comments all 
around. 
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Clearly also the thesis that sense determines reference is an 
outgrowth of the practical attitude, and its denial a product of the 
theoretical attitude. If you attend to context, and are concerned about the 
practical problem of how names are learned, you are likely to support the 
idea that sense fixes reference. If, on the other hand, you attend to the fact 
that names fix rigidly upon their referents, despite changes in 
characteristics and knowledge-even through counterfactual variation of 
the thing in question— you are positing, from the theoretical standpoint, a 
context-invariant reference relation. Which attitude and corresponding 
thesis is correct? Neither and both. The ambiguity of the phrase "fixes the 
reference" allows the question to be interpreted differently from the 
theoretical and the practical standpoints. The resolution offered 
previously—that sense fixes reference initially, but not thereafter—is 
likewise revealed to be a pragmatic attempt to adjudicate between what 
might in the end be fundamentally irreconcilable attitudes. 
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